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INTRODUCTION 
Price control and related commercial issues have been 
among the most controversial national political issues in 
Ghana. Debates and accusations concerning price control 
enforcement and the acceptable or actual role of traders have 
been used to justify the rise and fall of national governments. 
Successive military and civilian governments in Ghana since 
independence have faced rising prices, especially of imports and 
manufactures, which critics attributed to their soft or corrupt 
tactics in price control. Each new government then legitimised 
itself with an initial episode of strict enforcement, which 
tapered off and gave rise to new accusations. Price control thus 
plays a particularly prominent role here in the processes of 
state formation and regime stabilization. 
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which 
brought Flight Lieutenant J .  J .  Rawlings to power on June 4, 
1979, claimed that Lt. Col. Akuffo, who had ousted 
longstanding head of state Gen. Acheampong the year before, 
had not gone far enough in punishing those who had benefited 
from corruption. Akuffo had made arrests and ordered a strict 
enforcement episode shortly after taking office, but enforcement 
had already relaxed considerably. Declarations on price control 
were among the earliest proclamations of the AFRC, the day 
after the coup. 
Rawlings considered a t  that point that corruption could be 
cured by removing corrupt individuals from the existing system. 
During its short term of office (June to October, 1979), the 
AFRC carried out what it called a "housecleaning exercise" 
directed a t  government officials, private formal sector 
enterprises and market traders. The first targets were those 
involved in illegal distribution of imports (see C. Robertson, 
1983). Although official price control regulations did not 
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include local foodstuffs, enforcement was extended to them 
several weeks later, without an immediate legal basis. 
This paper describes that exercise, its extension and its 
effects on Kumasi food supplies, along with traders' responses.1 
For comparison, i t  also briefly describes their responses to the 
currency exchange exercise carried out under Akuffo earlier the 
same year and its effects. Although the AFRC repeatedly 
stated that the housecleaning exercise was not aimed a t  
punishing the ordinary market trader, but only the middlemen 
and women, i t  damaged her more deeply and permanently than 
the currency exchange. 
Detailed analysis of a specific encounter between traders 
and the state makes it easier to get beyond the presentation of 
either side as an undifferentiated unit in such encounters. 
Specific groups wielding some authority from the state, 
including police, soldiers, local and national government officials 
and traditional leaders, each had their own interests and 
patterns of action within the overall situation. Traders' 
responses also reveal critical subdivisions within their ranks, by 
commodity, gender, trading role and capital level, which 
determined both their motivation and capacity for specific 
responses. 
The actions and reactions of these predominantly female, 
Asante traders show the necessity of analysing women not 
simply in relation to their household status, but in relation to 
their work status, as for male traders or wage workers. These 
women were wives and mothers, and in many cases their 
family financial responsibilities motivated their trading 
activities, but their commercial relations were largely distinct 
from household relations. Few worked in kin-based trading 
networks like those described for Accra Ga women (C. 
Robertson, 1984). Commercial relations were not extensions of 
family and marital relations, although Asante women also 
considered the latter extremely important. The tendency in 
many West African cultures for spouses and close kin to have 
separate budgets and even to avoid joint economic enterprises 
may partly explain this separation of work and household 
identities (C. Robertson 1983, p.483; Clark, 1984). 
Trading roles identified with Asante women were 
historically constructed as gendered relations in themselves, as 
much so as the roles of wife and mother. As for family and 
marital roles, this continuing process of reproduction and 
reconstruction of trading roles involves both class-type 
economic differentiation and state intervention. The 
articulation of family with occupational relations is in fact an 
important aspect of differentiation for both men and women 
(Clark, 1988 ). 
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Attention to this process of the historical construction of 
both traders and the state itself sheds light on the course of 
events and on their impact. Gender, ethnic, commodity and 
trading role divisions among traders specify their history of 
confrontation and collusion with the state, and with specific 
agents of the state. All of those characteristics have been 
significant to state relations for traders (and also for other 
occupational groups, such as farmers), and continue to be 
significant in the present case. 
HISTORY OF PRICE CONTROL 
A long history of intervention in trade, including price 
formation, by colonial and pre-colonial rulers (explored in 
detail in Clark, n.d.(b)) gave these efforts a t  food price control 
wide local acceptance. Although import and export controls 
were most frequent, controls were repeatedly extended to local 
crops in times of crisis. The studies collected recently by Guyer 
(1987) show that concern for and intervention in urban food 
supply systems by both colonial and chiefly authorities, 
although not always effective, was by no means a rare 
phenomenon in Africa. 
In nineteenth century Asante, the Asantehene2 taxed and 
regulated trade in foodstuffs with neighboring chiefdoms. 
During public crises, he might control local food prices, 
requisition food for government needs, and embargo specific 
neighbors (Wilks, 1975; Brown 1972). The British colonial 
government similarly intervened during both World Wars to 
maintain adequate, low-cost food supplies for major cities, 
mines, barracks, and other government needs, although with 
limited success. In Asante, food prices were only set for 
Kumasi (the regional capital) and a few mining centers, and 
proved largely unenforceable. Import prices also were 
frequently ignored or officially raised (NAK3,7,13). 
Ideological initiatives of the colonial power complemented 
price lists, arrests and requisitions. Colonial officials blamed 
rising food prices and falling real wages on supposedly parasitic 
market women, who were strongly defended by nationalist 
leaders, including Danquah (NAA4,5,6). While opposing food 
price controls, nationalist leaders pressed strongly for controlled 
prices of imports in a direct and rather sophisticated attack on 
the worsening terms of trade. One of the earliest nationalist 
actions, the 1938 cocoa hcldup, also sprang from this awareness 
and resentment of oligopolistic commercial relations and 
worsening terms of trade. 
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Upon independence, the Convention People's Party 
government, led by Kwame Nkrumah, followed up on both 
colonial and nationalist agendas. I t  expanded controls over 
imports, especially the popular consumer items on the list of 
"essential commodities." This list included moderately priced 
consumer imports and local manufactures, such as evaporated 
milk, canned fish, toothpaste and toilet paper, as well as 
"African print" cloth. 
Faced with high inflation and worsening terms of trade, 
government propagandists adopted the colonial rhetoric of 
blaming market women, despite Nkrumah's debt to their 
support in the independence struggle. Price controls and 
currency regulations applied only to imported and 
manufactured commodities, but public distribution agencies like 
the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC) tried to 
undermine traders' control of local foodstuffs circulation as well. 
The notable failure of the GFDC to capture a significant 
percentage of the foodstuffs trade testifies to the complexity 
and value of the distributive tasks performed by the market 
traders, which public employees were unable to assume.3 
Trading patterns for imports and local manufactures, 
especially those officially designated "essential commodities," 
adjusted during the 1960s and 70s to the reality of import and 
price controls. The cycle of episodes of strict enforcement (often 
in November) followed by periods of toleration for illegal 
trading had become routine by 1979. Traders with family or 
corrupt connections to police, customs or legal distributors had 
a greater advantage than before. In the seller's market created 
by acute shortages of these goods, such connections were more 
essential to enterprise viability than business acumen or effort. 
The adjustment process widened existing gaps between 
traders defined by family background and by capital level, and 
made these correspond more closely to commodity divisions. 
Traders in essential commodities who lacked the official 
connections and capital resources to survive enforcement 
episodes had either gone bankrupt or switched to local 
foodstuffs and craft products by this time. Some individuals 
reported switching because of psychological exhaustion from the 
stress of raids, arrests and confiscations, as Smart reports for 
Hong Kong traders leaving illegal locations (J.Smart). The 
extension of price controls to local foodstuffs and craft products 
during the 1979 "housecleaning exercise" thus not only 
hit those traders with the least resources to survive such 
attacks, but hit numerous traders who had moved into local 
foodstuffs trading precisely to avoid such episodes. 
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THE AFRC "HOUSECLEANING EXERCISE" 
The Initial Campaign 
The AFRC began by punishing those who had offended 
against existing price and import controls on essential 
commodities. Their first target was the Makola #1 Market in 
Accra, renowned as  the premier marketplace in the country for 
wholesaling imported and manufactured items, including cloth. 
This was looted the day of the coup, closed down, and 
eventually blown up by dynamite (C. Robertson, 1983). 
Although it  was the seat of wholesaling, Makola #1 also 
included many retailers and traders in unregulated goods. 
In Kumasi, price control enforcement also began with 
traders in imports and manufactures. The day after the coup, 
military officers in Kumasi entered the main Kumasi Central 
Market and sold off the stocks of traders in the provisions 
section a t  control prices. Sometimes the proceeds were given to 
the trader, sometimes they were kept for the "government 
chest." On the next day, soldiers broke open stalls in the 
adjacent cloth section and sold off the cloth, or confiscated it 
Owners of confiscated goods could go to the barracks later, if 
they dared, to bargain with the soldiers about the "control" 
value which they would be paid. After they finished. a mob 
that had collected to buy cloth and watch the proceedings 
crossed the street to loot stalls in the main lorry park. 
The same day, soidiers took over the major formal sector 
stores downtown, moving down each street in turn. They sold 
out their stocks completely, including many items not covered 
by existing price controls. Since there was no official price, 
soldiers set prices on the spot, at one-fourth to one-tenth the 
commercial price. Searches of the homes of prominent store 
managers, former officials and Lebanese yielded further stores 
of hoarded goods, which were confiscated and taken to the 
barracks. Seized stores or government outlets were used to sell 
confiscated goods from various sources. There was a even brief 
glut of soft drinks from confiscated supplies. Within two or 
three weeks, such supplies ran out, and the stores stood empty. 
A high level of street violence in Kumasi, as well as other 
parts of the country, continued for several weeks after the coup. 
Turbulent crowds roamed the streets, carrying large sums of 
money, ready to run for a place in line when a store suddenly 
began selling something. Standing in line brought injuries, 
either from belts and nightsticks of the attending soldiers, or 
from the free-for-alls that erupted once sales began. 
Shortages of staple foodstuffs like plantain and cassava led to 
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long lines in their parts of the market. which also broke down 
into fights. 
Official and semi-official violence reached levels unknown 
since the days of party politics. Price control offenders were 
officially beaten, caned and flogged naked and unofficially 
shaved with broken bottles. One was shot. Rumors circulated 
about women who had miscarried or had babies beaten to death 
on their backs. Traders who had taken previous economic 
losses philosophically became obsessed with repeating these 
stories of beatings and humiliations. 
The rhetoric of official attacks on traders combined 
accusations of abuses of their middleman position with a 
generous dose of sexual hostility, analysed in more detail 
elsewhere (C. Robertson 1983; Clark n.d.(b)). Resentment 
among educated, salaried workers, hard hit by rampant 
inflation, of the disappearing (or reversing) gap between their 
incomes and those of uneducated relatives (including almost all 
women) also fed the flames. Media statements whipping up 
public outrage that even a few illiterate women could become 
as wealthy and powerful as some educated men created a 
climate that illegitimised any attempt to preserve traders' 
economic or consultative rights. 
As Robertson comments,-the enthusiastic endorsement of 
condemnations of women traders by wide segments of the 
Ghanaian population was surprising, considering that most of 
that population had close female relatives in trade (C. 
Robertson, 1983). Kinship ideals that presume separate 
financial and personal interests between husband and wife and 
between other household members may have made such 
attitudes easier to adopt, since spouse or kin do not necessarily 
see a woman's success as a benefit to them. The only public 
defenses of market women portrayed them as impoverished, 
helpless mothers, rather than as respected social actors. The 
message was clear: women traders could be tolerated as long as 
they remained powerless and unsuccessful. 
These enforcement activities for non-food items had a 
negative impact on food sales in the market. Many foodstuffs 
traders, along with most other Kumasi residents with any 
money in their pockets, abandoned their work to stand in long 
lines for bargains on not only canned milk and mackerel, but 
freezers, mattresses, televisions and electric fans. Rumors that  
soldiers would soon come to the produce sections of the market 
encouraged more traders to stay away from the market if they 
could afford it. Villagers nervous about the general violence 
and thievery stayed away from Kumasi, with their goods. 
Serious food shortages developed in Kumasi and other 
major cities immediately after the coup, although the 
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government took no direct action against local foodstuffs 
traders for the first two weeks. Large cities and institutions 
like hospitals suffered the most, since they depended most on 
centrally purchased supplies. For more than a month, it was 
difficult in Kumasi for a household to locate enough traditional 
foodstuffs for meals, regardless of price. Mothers told of coming 
to Kumasi Central Market and crying, because they could find 
nothing to buy for the family. Urban residents quickly realised 
that they were more dependent on the rural areas than rice 
versa. When possible, families sent their children and other 
unemployed members to stay with rural relatives until food 
supplies improved. Newspapers considered the price and 
supply of food in different towns a major news item for the 
entire AFRC period. 
Food Price Control 
The AFRC began food price control very gingerly. First, 
they called for voluntary restraint and repeated empty 
assurances of physical safety in the towns. They began to 
enforce price control on the day of the national elections, June 
18. Most traders and customers alike had taken the day off to 
go to the polls. The authorities even took the trouble to send 
female police that  first day. They sold off the small stocks of 
the traders present in the yam, tomato and plantain sections, 
allowing the traders to collect the money, and warned others t o  
reduce their prices. Since no control prices existed for these 
goods, they simply reduced existing prices by half. To control 
lines they used the "female" method of throwing buckets of 
water, rather than the belts and nightsticks commonly used by 
male police or the guns brandished by male soldiers. No 
traders were assaulted or goods confiscated. 
Price control brought chaos to the wholesale yards the next 
day. Arriving traders who had begun to unload their yams 
threw them back into the trucks and drove away when they 
heard the news. Villagers arriving in the lorry park also 
simply turned around and went home with their produce. 
Armed soldiers began to patrol the wholesale yards, supervising 
forced sales from the trucks, and make forays into the 
foodstuffs "lines". The lack of known legal prices prevented 
effective cooperation with the soldiers. If traders set a low 
price, hoping to avoid trouble, the soldiers simply halved it 
again. 
Several traders expressed the view that soldiers were 
mainly interested in getting food for their own consumption, 
rather than enforcing low prices. Soldiers often took goods 
away without any compensation, telling an oil seller, for 
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example, to come to the barracks in two weeks for her empty 
containers. Even when they sold the goods immediately, they 
made their own purchases first. With foodstuffs so scarce, this 
could exhaust the supplies available, even on July 12, almost a 
month later. 
Setting official "control" prices for local foodstuffs presented 
immense practical problems, because of the wide variations in 
size, quality and condition characteristic of most popular 
foodstuffs. Price bargaining over individual units normally 
compensates for these variations. Standard prices for many 
foodstuffs cannot be widely publicised, understood and applied, 
because it remains unclear exactly what goods they apply to. 
When the first price lists came out, on June 23rd, they used 
units like kilos, not common in retail sales, and made no 
allowance for size, quality, distance from the producing region, 
or seasonal scarcity. The enforcement of uniform prices for 
chickens, for example, removed the premium for 
well-developed specimens. Soon only immature, small birds 
were for sale. The same happened with plantain, which was 
largely sold before maturity, if sold at all. 
When foodstuffs stopped coming to Kumasi and other large 
towns, soldiers expanded their activities to major village 
periodic markets. Soldiers stationed nearby would visit these 
markets on the market day, confiscating goods in the possession 
of villagers or traders for sale a t  reduced prices or for use at the 
barracks. Villagers taking goods to sell at local periodic 
markets might find them purchased by the military a t  control 
price, although villagers did not usually suffer the physical 
abuse that traders did. Traders were conspicuous targets if 
they bought in wholesale quantities or transported goods on the 
roads, so they were afraid to visit the markets. The few 
Kumasi traders who still ventured to their usual markets at 
this time reported that villagers stayed away from them, so 
they gave up the effort. 
Farmers even avoided the informal sales locations 
established a t  highway or farm trail intersections. Those who 
still wanted to sell would take a small quantity of goods and 
walk along the roadside. If soldiers questioned them, they 
could claim they were carrying it home from the farm for 
family consumption. Hitherto this strategy had only been used 
by suppliers of imports. 
When even the village markets largely emptied of goods, 
soldiers and other enforcement personnel began to "hijack" 
trucks. Soldiers from more remote barracks, without the 
advantage of access to a major market, would lie in wait on the 
major highways leading to Kumasi and intercept passing 
trucks, confiscating whole truckloads of produce. Town-based 
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soldiers also captured trucks entering the outskirts of town. 
This tactic could only be loosely linked to price control 
enforcement, since the goods had not yet been offered for sale 
a t  any specific price, nor had they been hoarded. These 
truckloads were occasionally sold retail a t  control prices on the 
spot, but more often they were taken off to a nearby barracks. 
Not only freight trucks but mixed passenger/freight trucks were 
taken. Even a single bag or basket of produce could be 
considered evidence of intent to resell and confiscated under 
threat of arrest. 
Effects on Supplies and Prices 
Despite the energy devoted to these drastic actions, they 
did not achieve the desired effect of securing low-cost, plentiful 
urban food supplies. Farmers overwhelmingly responded by 
keeping their produce off the market. Traders themselves 
cannot hoard food supplies, because limited space, poor facilities 
and rapid spoilage prevent them from storing significant 
amounts (C. Robertson, 1983, p.480; see Clark, n.d.(a), for 
more detail). Enforcement efforts directed a t  traders thus could 
not release extra food to consumers, even temporarily. 
Farmers7 ability t o  delay crop sales depended on the 
perishability of their specific crops, leading to uneven food 
shortages in Kumasi. Semi-perishable staples such as yams 
and corn were stored on the farm as long as possible. The 
AFRC came to power in June, before the yam harvest. 
Farmers normally begin taking early yams from their plants in 
July, to catch the high early prices. In 1979, they delayed 
harvesting for months, as long as December, until they needed 
to prepare the fields for replanting. Some still stored their 
yams in pits on the farm for several months afterwards. 
Likewise, some corn was normally sold green, as an early treat 
before the new yams. In 1979, farmers left it all to  mature. 
Perishable vegetables like tomatoes and garden eggs could 
not be harvested later. They came back on the market fairly 
quickly, but in smaller quantities than normal for that season. 
Cassava, though highly perishable once harvested, can be left 
in the ground for long periods without deterioration. It is 
planted on less desirable land than yams, so consequently 
disappeared from the market entirely until all danger was past. 
Ironically, food price control enforcement raised effective 
food prices above their previous level due to trade moving to 
clandestine locations, as well as from absolute urban shortages. 
Under normal conditions, Kumasi buyers and sellers enjoy a 
high level of information on supply, demand and prices paid. 
Visual inspection of goods and prices offered is the most 
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common information source. Price uniformity results from 
these publicly available high information levels, and never 
indicates prices set unilaterally by either side. Constant price 
variations between transactions compensate for size and quality 
variations, but also for fluctuating supply and demand during 
the day. The narrow price range lowers the risk for 
transactors, a major reason buyers and sellers patronise 
Kumasi Central Market. The low risk levels further lower 
prices, since they allow sellers to reduce their risk cushions. 
Commodities with higher risk levels also show wider price 
fluctuations. 
Good information flows extend to peripheral trading areas. 
Wholesale buyers from Kumasi Central Market wholesale yards 
regularly checked nearby informal locations, such as the lorry 
parks, for lower prices. Their knowledge of relative prices helps 
prevent artificially raised prices in the foodstuffs wholesale 
yards, since they are ready to buy elsewhere without delay. 
Likewise, when price control artificially lowered prices in the 
yards, these peripheral locations could and did rapidly expand 
the volume of produce they handled. Though effective, their 
role was short-lived because soldiers immediately expanded 
their activities to the well-known peripheral areas when goods 
vanished from the wholesale yards. 
What food arrived in Kumasi after the markets emptied 
was sold a t  dawn from the backs of trucks in shifting roadside 
locations passed by word of mouth. When sales moved to street 
corners, back alleys, disused gas stations and vacant lots, prices 
were more variable, but averaged higher. Furtive, hurried, 
dispersed sales drastically reduce price information levels, 
because i t  is difficult and dangerous to compare prices from 
different sources. Competition between sellers was greatly 
reduced by shortages, since buyers knew they might not find 
another source of the item they needed. Prices also rose simply 
from the great reductions in supply, and the higher risk margin 
needed to induce sellers to participate. A negligible amount of 
foodstuffs was ever sold to the public at control price. 
Hunger and Capital Position 
This economic disruption widened the gap between urban 
residents, including traders, with some cash reserves and those 
with none. During the enforced idleness, traders with any 
capital had to use it to meet subsistence needs. Market porters 
and the poorer traders who sold on commission or on credit 
suffered great hardship immediately, because they depended on 
each day or week's proceeds to buy food. Most traders had so 
little capital in hand that they could not hold out for the length 
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of this crisis. They either had to return to trading under 
dangerous, unprofitable conditions or go without food, usually 
both. 
Coping strategies which had developed to see traders 
through seasonal shortages or individual crises such as illness 
or capital loss could not work now, due to the broad impact of 
this crisis. Many traders routinely adjusted to seasonal supply 
problems by switching to unaffected commodities or to craft 
work. Price control affected so many commodities that  none 
were left to substitute. A surprising number of foodstuffs 
traders, including some who had previously fled cloth or 
provisions trading, began selling ice water, the most inoffensive 
(and unprofitable) item imaginable. Even they met with 
occasional rough treatment from soldiers. Craft alternatives 
like sewing or baking had also come to a standstill, due to lack 
of supplies and customers. Asking for emergency loans from 
trading partners or non-trading relatives or neighbors, a 
common strategy in individual catastrophes, was useless now, 
since they faced similar problems. 
In fact, almost all economic activity ceased in Kumasi, 
between standing in lines, fear and lack of supplies. Possession 
of goods in normal working quantities for either trade or 
production brought punishment for hoarding. Drastic policy 
swings, usually retroactive, were so unpredictable that 
members of almost any occupation felt it might suddenly 
become illegal. Buying power was so affected that  the demand 
for food was substantially reduced when controls were 
eventually relaxed and supplies returned. 
Rural families with acute cash needs suffered along with 
poor urban families from the interruption in crop sales. Many 
farmers had committed their resources to specialised 
commercial food production to the extent that  they depended on 
crop sales to finance purchase of other foods. Farm families 
also needed cash to cover school fees, medical expenses and 
other crises. These problems hit poorer farmers harder, since 
they had little cash or food reserves. The low-volume, 
high-risk conditions of trade made it difficult for farmers to 
find buyers in case of emergency, and lowered the prices the 
few remaining traders were willing to offer. 
Ideological Basis 
The AFRC justified its hostility to traders by emphasizing 
the economic advantages of direct sales from farmers to 
consumers. Traders supposedly forced prices up by frustrating 
this natural mechanism. Contrary to this model, direct sales 
are never very attractive to farmers, because of the farming 
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days they lose in locating transport, selling their goods, and 
returning home. They were even more reluctant t o  make the 
trip to the city under these violent and unsettled conditions, nor 
was there much for them to buy there. Occasionally, military 
trucks were sent to buy farm produce or sell consumer goods in 
rural areas, but very little direct sales took place despite official 
exhortations. Lack of response to similar efforts in Peru 
suggests that economic realities, rather than fear of violence, 
are the determining factors on this issue (Babb, this volume). 
Ghanaian farmers found i t  more attractive to hold goods off the 
market, if a t  all possible, than cooperate with direct sales. 
Realising the insecurity of their access to urban markets, 
farmers in more remote regions reverted to a more 
subsistence-oriented planting pattern, a t  least temporarily. 
The price control experience weakened rural confidence in the 
food distribution system and in commercialisation itself. It led 
to some return to subsistence farming, especially in remote 
areas already facing interruptions in commercial contact 
because of transport problems. After all, farmers complained, 
they had nothing to buy with the money they earned, since 
legal supplies of imports rarely reached the rural areas. The 
money itself might be again declared obsolete, as in the 
currency exchange exercise earlier in 1979. Both long and 
short-term effects on farmers thus lowered urban food 
supplies. 
While armed enforcement proved capable of seriously 
disrupting and damaging the existing food distribution system, 
i t  proved incapable of substituting for it. Under conditions of 
strict enforcement, a government implicitly claims that the 
official or legal distribution system can supply all of the 
recognised needs of the population. As the AFRC period wore 
on with no increase in urban staple food supplies, these claims 
lost credibility and food price control was quietly loosened. The 
Asantehene's police occasionally made rounds to encourage low 
prices, but they approached the traders involved quietly and 
carried no arms or nightsticks. I t  was left to the later 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government 
(1982-4) to make serious attempts to set up an alternative 
foodstuffs distribution network linking farmers to urban and 
institutional buyers. 
Demolitions 
As the date for handover to civilian rule approached, the 
AFRC turned t o  a series of demolitions to make a lasting mark 
on the nation's marketplace system. A few days after the 
demolition of Makola #1, on September 5th, markets in 
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regional capitals, including Kumasi, were destroyed. Like 
Makola #1, Kumasi Central Market was a regional center of 
imports distribution. Unlike Makola #1, however, it was also 
the city's only wholesale market for most local foodstuffs. 
Rumors claimed tha t  Kumasi City Council members only 
narrowly managed to avert plans to demolish the entire 
Kumasi Central Market, on this basis. 
The demolition episode displayed divisions between 
different parts of the state apparatus. City Council opposition 
may have reflected the major contribution of market fees and 
rents to the city budget. The Market Manager claimed to have 
had no advance warning. Like the most drastic price control 
enforcement, demolition was carried out by soldiers, who were 
less likely to have local origins. Police and the Asantehene's 
police had been noticeably more polite and less violent in 
previous actions, and took no part  in this one. 
To implement this policy successfully, the AFRC took 
advantage of internal divisions among traders by nationality, 
commodity and spatial location. Demolitions began a t  dawn, in 
a section tha t  was marginal physically, organisationally and 
economically to the rest of the market, a n  area of makeshift 
stalls at the rear of the market called the "French Line." Here, 
men from Northern Ghana and adjacent French-speaking 
countries sold shoes and other imported clothing, and reputedly 
changed currency through their commercial contacts. As for 
Makola #1, complete demolition was supposedly required to 
uncover buried hoards of foreign currency. 
First, soldiers surrounded this section to prevent removal of 
property. Soldiers with semi-automatic weapons rode the 
bulldozers as  they razed the flimsy wooden stalls, while others 
searched and confiscated property. When the bulldozers had 
finished the French Line, however, they simply kept going, 
uprooting shade trees and levelling several small mosques and 
adjacent trading areas. Within two days, everything outside 
the old market walls had come down, about one-third of the 
total contiguous area administered as  Kumasi Central Market. 
This comprised open areas where villagers sold their foodstuffs, 
several wholesale yards, and sections selling used clothing, craft 
goods and drugs. Ironically, the cloth and provisions sections, 
the Kumasi equivalent to Makola #1, remained touched 
because they lay inside the walls. 
Although outside the original market walls, these areas 
were official market locations. Traders using them were 
registered individually and paid rent to the city, in addition to 
their daily market fees. One factor in the amount of rent they 
paid was the size and elaboration of the structures they had 
erected, a t  their own expense but with city permission. Some 
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sold from portable tables, while others had roofed stalls or 
enclosed, locking kiosks. Capital investment was not 
necessarily lower for these traders than for those within the 
market walls. The area housed some businesses based on 
valuable equipment--sewing machines, corn mills or chest 
freezers. Some traders had even recently received permission 
to expand their buildings or build new kiosks. 
Market traders were given only a few hours notice, 
depending on their exact location in the path of the bulldozers, 
to remove or sell off their goods and salvage their equipment. 
Traders hurriedly arranged to store their inventory and 
equipment in nearby houses, or to transport it to their homes. 
Proprietors of a walk-in cold store that sold frozen fish and ice 
blocks to  traders negotiated two days' grace to move out their 
freezer equipment. Owners of kiosks, designed to be movable, 
either found someone to cart them away immediately or saw 
them demolished. Salvagers lingered to buy up the roofing 
sheets and lumber that were left. 
As demolition progressed over two days, various 
justifications for the policy from official spokesmen appeared in 
local newspapers or circulated through rumors. Most 
statements referred to it as a street clearance campaign, 
supposed to provide for easy passage for pedestrians and supply 
trucks in the market precincts. The other expressed goals of 
tourist-oriented civic beautification and efficient, intensive 
land use seemed far-fetched, in view of the realities of Ghana's 
economic problems, although the same issues have some 
plausibility for the Indian, Hong Kong, and US cases elsewhere 
in this volume (Lessinger, A. Smart, and Spalter-Roth). In 
Kumasi, long-dormant plans for a clinic and "superhighway" 
on one side of the market were briefly resurrected, although 
cement and money were then unavailable even for construction 
projects already designed and half completed. 
Only token efforts were made to keep demolished areas 
clear, showing that officials had little need to disguise the 
punitive nature of the clearance. Within a week, traders 
reoccupied the same areas they traded in before the clearance, 
with no further attempts to chase them away, and tax 
collection resumed. Traders sat in the same locations, selling 
the same commodities, but now they sat in the sun with their 
babies and their perishable vegetables instead of enjoying the 
meagre comfort of a roofing sheet or two. 
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TRADERS' RESPONSES 
Price Control Negotiations 
Foodstuffs traders did have publicly recognised commodity 
groups and leaders, called ahemma, providing an organisational 
structure capable of rapid response to such crises. Group 
leaders' central functions were dispute settlement and 
negotiations with external bodies, not commercial regulation. 
Negotiating skills carry high prestige in Asante culture, and 
traders demand high skill levels from their leaders (Clark, 
1984). 
In contrast to C. Robertson's report of passivity on the part 
of Accra market women (1983), the Kumasi ahemmafuo 
(collective plural) did respond quickly, requesting mediation 
from the city and regional officials and chiefs with whom they 
usually take up sensitive external issues. Soon these elderly 
and middle-aged women were complaining of an exhausting 
schedule of formal meetings and informal sessions initiated by 
themselves or others. It was startling to hear them complain in 
the same breath that the authorities did not want to negotiate. 
Market ahemma claimed that  "they don't want to talk" 
despite incessant summons to meetings, because these meetings 
did not follow norms of legitimate "talking" as they knew them. 
Precisely because negotiations figure so prominently in Asante 
chiefly and marketplace ideals, traders have well-developed 
procedural norms and expect general respect for them. Proper 
dispute settlement procedures call for the full expression of all 
views before making a decision, and the agreement of all 
parties to  the final settlement. A. Robertson confirms in a 
rural setting the importance of conforming to accepted, familiar 
meeting styles and procedures in order to ensure effective and 
recognized participation (A. Robertson 1976). 
The AFRC broke these norms in several important ways. 
They ignored the definition of negotiations by scheduling their 
"consultation" meetings after they had already made major 
decisions. During the meetings, opposing parties did not 
acknowledge points brought up by traders by agreeing or 
disagreeing, but simply repeated previous threats and 
exhortations. The authorities also failed to abide by 
agreements or promises made during meetings with traders. 
For example, an attempt was made to establish standard 
size and quality grades for staple foodstuffs, t o  bring order to 
price control enforcement. The ahemmafuo brought samples of 
the major vegetable staples to the Ashanti Regional Offices. 
Under the sponsorship of the Regional Commissioner, they 
agreed with representatives of consumers, government buyers 
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and the military on control prices for different sizes. In the 
next few days. however, soldiers in the market refused to 
recognize these prices or size grades and continued to set prices 
arbitrarily. The ahemma then counseled traders to stop buying 
from farmers unless they could obtain low enough prices to 
allow for this kind of sales. 
The most elaborate meeting during this period led to the 
most resentment. Traders viewed both procedural and 
rhetorical features a s  insults to their leaders. Ahemma were 
not given a choice of time or place, but summoned to the 
meeting held in their own shed. The President and Secretary 
of the National Farmers' Association and a leader of the official 
farm laborer's association (all men) made no pretense of 
consultation or seeking mutual agreement. They harangued 
the traders about their stubborn refusal to lower prices, and 
threatened tha t  traders would suffer for their evil ways. They 
completely ignored traders' counterclaims tha t  farmers refused 
to sell a t  low prices. A particularly offensive speaker 
repeatedly asked "wati?" (lit. have you heard?), a phrase 
commonly used to instruct children or subordinates. One 
ohemma (sing.) complained, "They treat us like children. when 
we are old enough to be their mothers." During the meetings, 
the senior ohemma drew attention covertly to the fact that  this 
meeting had no authority to decide anything by referring 
repeatedly and favorably to her ongoing negotiations with truck 
drivers over freight rates. In both sets of meetings, 
participants commonly referred to each other a s  "the men" and 
"the women." 
I t  is revealing to compare these meetings with price 
negotiations held during the same later months of the AFRC 
government with leaders of predominantly male occupations, to 
set control prices for their products. In each case, 
representatives of suppliers of raw materials attended, and the 
prices of finished products and raw materials were set as a 
package. Producers of adinkra cloth, furniture and poultry 
linked their control prices to those of imported plain cloth, 
manufactured lumber, poultry feed and medicines. Meetings 
with drivers and transport owners likewise used control prices 
for gasoline, motor oil and spare parts to calculate legal 
passenger and freight rates. 
Negotiations with male leaders did not produce exactly the 
desired results for either side, but procedures showed more 
respect. The resulting agreements were neither predetermined 
or ignored. Male leaders were not delegtimised for being group 
leaders, nor their followers for having specific occupational 
interests. These negotiated prices could not openly compensate 
for the necessity to buy supplemental supplies on the black 
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market to stay in business, but the men used these meetings as 
a forum to press for larger allocations of foreign exchange for 
their imported supplies. Although the AFRC could not usually 
provide the level of supplies needed, they did abide by prices set 
a t  these meetings. These men were often idle from lack of legal 
supplies, or forced to resort to illegal supplies, but at least they 
were never harrassed for selling a t  the agreed prices. 
RESPONSES TO THE CURRENCY EXCHANGE 
The currency exchange exercise carried out in March, 1979. 
before the AFRC coup, provides another contrast. The AFRC 
government exerted itself to discredit market leaders and 
frustrate their attempts to help traders adjust to price control 
or circumvent it. Akuffo's government, althougli aiming the 
currency exchange partly against wealthy market traders, kept 
the official exchange procedures relatively straightforward and 
stable. 
After closing all the borders, the government announced on 
Friday, March 9, that  all existing banknotes would become 
valueless on March 26. The entire population had to exchange 
its old notes for new ones through the banks, a t  a rate of ten 
old to seven new cedis. Very large amounts would be 
exchanged a t  five new for ten old cedis, creating instant 
employment for thousands of poor persons who took the excess 
cedis of their wealthier relatives and neighbors for exchange. 
Although the deadline was extended another two weeks and 
extra facilities for exchange set up, the basic procedure 
remained the same. Individual capital losses varied arbitrarily, 
depending on the amount of capital in physical cash form that  
evening. 
Market leaders' responses demonstrated their ability to 
expand their regulatory role temporarily in time of crisis, when 
left to manage their own adaptive processes. First they 
coordinated discussions of the procedures and practical 
implications of the exchange. This raised general information 
levels and formed a consensus on joint strategies for weathering 
the transition period. Leaders then publicised these decisions, 
so tha t  individual traders would not suffer disproportionately. 
Kumasi traders and other urban dwellers suffered much less 
hardship than rural residents, who faced long journeys on 
scarce transport a t  exorbitant rates and waited for days a t  the 
few small-town banks, without new cedis for food or water. 
In Kumasi Central Market, for example, commodity group 
relations helped traders decide how to respond. In the onion 
shed, onion traders met informally in the aisles Saturday 
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morning to discuss the announcements. The ohemma collected 
information on procedures and rates of exchange and repeated 
it. One woman had brought a poster of the new money, which 
the ohemma showed around. The shed watchmen held their 
own conclave, which the ohemma visited. Some continued to do 
business a t  normal prices, as the government had instructed. 
As traders began to  realize the old money had been effectively 
discounted, they stopped selling except for payment in coins. 
Individual retailers decided either to go home, or to adjust their 
prices and charge ten old cedis for seven in the original price. 
The exchange announcement created havoc in commercial 
credit, especially in the wholesale yards, where large amounts 
were involved. Hysterical wholesalers sought advice from their 
ahemma when debtors tried t o  force payment in old notes. 
Travellers would not accept the old notes from wholesalers, 
since they expected farmers to reject them, but could not afford 
to stay in town indefinitely. In hardship cases, leaders 
negotiated reasonable discounts for the old notes. The cassava 
yard closed down when drivers doubled freight charges, only 
reopening as traders obtained new notes. The onion yard also 
closed in the second week, when traders decided to take a break 
to finish changing. Although the yards closed, the ahemma 
came t o  market daily to monitor conditions. 
After the initial shock phase, commodity ahemma resumed 
a passive role. The level of commercial activity dropped to 
about half, since traders, drivers, suppliers and consumers all 
spent much of their time trying to exchange their money. 
Clients quarreled over who would receive the first few new 
notes when they began to appear. Although some appealed 
these cases to their ohemma, she could not settle them. Each 
trader had to decide which client was most valuable to her. 
Traders stated current sales prices either in new or old cedis, 
the latter prices climbing as the exchange deadline approached. 
Individual traders simply decided whether to accept old cedis or 
not, or to stay home. Some sellers extended credit rather than 
accept old notes. The ohemma could enforce these terms just 
like normal business agreements. A few traders with close 
bank connections continued accepting old cedis to the last day. 
Wide fluctuations in food supply from day to day also raised 
ordinary commercial risks and tensions. Less perishable 
foodstuffs stopped arriving until sellers could demand new 
cedis, including cassava, dried fish and plantains. Crops that 
required frequent harvests, such as tomatoes, could not find 
enough buyers, especially with new cedis. Stress and hunger 
shortened tempers, and disputes in general multiplied. 
Traders' responses were not effective in any absolute sense. 
They could not change the policy itself, or prevent capital losses 
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severe enough to reduce the scale of operation of many 
individuals. Only a handful of individual traders had either 
advance warning to deposit their cash, or close enough bank 
connections to circumvent exchange channels. However, 
traders' group actions did reduce or avoid the additional losses 
associated with commercial disruption, such a s  those during 
price control linked to suspension of normal information 
channels and dispute settlement procedures. 
The reliance on individual strategies for exchange meant 
that  this exercise, like price control, exacerbated tensions and 
disadvantages based on existing social stratification. Exchange 
procedures favored urban over rural residents, and those with 
elite connections over the marginal poor. As in provisions and 
cloth trading, corrupt individual relations proved more reliable 
than rational or industrious choices. Workers for large public 
or private employers could participate in special group 
exchange facilities not available to the self-employed. 
Individual traders with some capital suffered losses, but could 
better survive the weeks of reduced activity than those 
dependent on daily or weekly receipts. The violent conditions 
of standing in line a t  banks, a s  for confiscated goods, favored 
strong, able-bodied young men over the elderly or weak, or 
mothers with babies on their backs. 
CONCLUSION 
Food price controls were exceptionally disruptive to 
distribution, both because of their novelty and because of 
official response to traders' adjustment efforts. Traders in 
imports and manufactures had already made their peace with 
episodic price control enforcement. Those without some 
political connections protecting them from prosecution and 
financial strength to survive periods of retreat had left the 
business years before. The AFRC brought simply a longer, 
more intense seige of the same tactics. Some individuals 
suffered great physical and financial damage, and many went 
out of business because of the length of their unemployment. 
but the system of distribution itself did not break down. 
Trading in essential commodities was completely illegal, so 
open group negotiations were out of the question and former 
leaders had long since retired. 
Although not completely unprecedented, government 
intervention in trade in local foodstuffs had never before been 
either widespread or effective. Food traders had no established 
strategies for dealing with it. Foodstuffs policies remained 
"new" for months, due to rapid, radical shifts in the prices and 
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behavior subject to attack. Erratic and non-standardised 
enforcement compounded fluctuations and contradictions in 
announced offical policy. Each attempt by foodstuff traders to 
adjust to, compromise with, or evade price controls brought a 
change in enforcement tactics or policies, aimed a t  their new 
practices. The result was widespread demoralisation and 
hopelessness that persisted long after enforcement had ceased. 
Government actions demonstrated hostility not only to 
leaders of illegal activities, but to market leaders as such. 
Foodstuffs commodity group leaders were ignored or humiliated 
in the negotiation processes already described. The mere 
existence of market groups and leaders was denounced in public 
announcements as evidence of traders' conspiracy to ruin the 
economy. The Asante chiefly hierarchy was recruited to attack 
their prestige by announcing they were not entitled to use the 
title ohemma, but could only be considered headmen. Market 
ahemma joked about their supposed sex change operations, but 
deeply resented the public insult by a hierarchy that had 
hitherto recognised them as leading members of the community 
on public occasions. 
Comparison of the two policy crises points to the 
importance of market leaders in minimising both individual and 
group damage from hostile policies, even without formal 
recognition. Market leaders coordinated or facilitated traders' 
individual responses to the currency exchange, rather than 
directing a group or collective response. This indirect role, 
when not actively frustrated, proved more effective than 
attempts a t  direct negotiations which found no sincere 
response. 
More contradiction between ideology and practice emerged 
in the AFRC's relations with ordinary traders. The AFRC 
continually published statements claiming it was not against 
the small-scale trader or producer, even advising Makola 
traders to go into food selling, but actions and policies both 
belied this distinction. Not only did enforcement efforts 
concentrate on the more vulnerable, poorer traders, but other 
policy statements revealed an intent to eliminate food trading 
as such. 
As in other economic sectors, the poorest traders bore the 
brunt of both direct military action and its economic side 
effects. Only a few foodstuffs traders were wealthy enough to 
consider buying protection or stopping altogether until the 
situation stabilised. Most lived on their daily or weekly income, 
and had to try some kind of economic activity. Those without 
capital to lose lost weight, paying in their health and strength. 
Traders' loss of capital, through consumption or 
confiscation, had a devastating effect on commercial efficiency 
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at  both high and relatively low levels. Individuals able to buy 
in the minimum wholesale quantity found themselves buying in 
smaller quantities from intermediaries. Buyers who had filled 
a truck themselves in the supply areas now shared with others, 
waited for passenger transport, or fell to retailing. Considering 
the importance of Ghanaian markets in food distribution, these 
capital and efficiency losses were a serious blow to  the national 
economy. 
Paradoxically, the price control episode, supposedly not 
aimed a t  ordinary market traders, was much more devastating 
to them than the currency exchange, which included traders 
among its target groups. This fact suggests a very weakly 
hidden agenda within the AFRC, of destroying the marketplace 
system as a power center in the economy resistant to 
government control (see also C. Robertson, 1983). This 
interpretation of underlying motives is consistent with 
historical trends in government commercial and regulatory 
policies affecting markets from the colonial period onwards. As 
further confirmation, this agenda was later openly avowed in 
the early days of the PNDC government (1982), which included 
many of the same high level leaders, including Rawlings 
himself. 
NOTES 
1. These events were observed during a research project 
funded by the Overseas Development Administration (UK) in 
Kumasi from 1978-80. Of course, the opinions expressed here 
are those of the author, not the ODA. Mona Etienne, Estellie 
Smith, Karen Hansen, Jane Guyer, Marjorie Mbilinyi and 
Lillian Trager made valuable comments on earlier versions of 
the paper, not all of which I was able to incorporate. 
2. The Asantehene is the ruler of the Asante confederacy, the 
largest political unit in present-day Ghana before British 
conquest in 1901. He retains substantial political, moral and 
ritual power throughout Asante, but especially in Kumasi, the 
capital. He supports a considerable staff and household, 
drawing on state financial support and legal status as well as 
indigenous properties and payments. 
3. Traders' productive contributions are discussed in greater 
detail by Claire Robertson (1983) and Florence Babb ( 1987). 
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